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About CoMPRA
The COVID-19 Macroeconomic Policy Response in Africa (CoMPRA) project was 
developed following a call for rapid response policy research into the COVID-19 
pandemic by the IDRC. The project’s overall goal is to inform macroeconomic 
policy development in response to the COVID-19 pandemic by low and middle-
income countries (LMICs) and development partners that results in more 
inclusive, climate-resilient, effective and gender-responsive measures through 
evidence-based research. This will help to mitigate COVID-19’s social and 
economic impact, promote recovery from the pandemic in the short term 
and position LMICs in the longer term for a more climate-resilient, sustainable 
and stable future. The CoMPRA project will focus broadly on African countries 
and specifically on six countries (Benin, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Nigeria 
and South Africa). SAIIA and CSEA, as the lead implementing partners for this 
project, also work with think tank partners in these countries. 
Abstract
COVID-19 has caused an unprecedented economic and health shock in Uganda, as has been the 
case globally. After the World Health Organization announcement that COVID-19 was a global 
pandemic, the government of Uganda undertook decisive measures to abate the spread of the 
virus through adopting COVID-19 containment measures. Also, in anticipation of the distortionary 
effects of COVID-19 on Uganda’s economy through the external and domestic effects channels, 
the government adopted an expansionary fiscal and monetary policy alongside financial sector 
interventions. Fiscal policy interventions involved the following: tax relief measures; government 
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expenditure through extending seed capital to vulnerable groups; strengthening health 
systems; enhancing the supply of agriculture inputs through the use of e-vouchers; banning the 
disconnection of users from utilities such as water and electricity; and payment of domestic 
arrears, among others. Monetary policy interventions included reducing the central bank rate 
(CBR) to 7%, its lowest level since inception in 2011. Financial sector intervention involved credit 
relief, asset quality support and liquidity support measures alongside supporting a reduction in 
mobile money charges. As such, this paper explores the macroeconomic impact of COVID-19 on 
Uganda’s economy, the macroeconomic policy choices undertaken and, finally, inclusiveness and 
viability of the various macroeconomic policy choices undertaken. The study used high frequency 
macroeconomic data to tease out the impact of COVID-19 on Uganda’s economy. Furthermore, 
through exploring the policy choices adopted, we also assess policy choice viability and extent 
of inclusiveness. The aforementioned policy interventions mitigated the extent of COVID-19 
distortions on Uganda’s economy. Indeed, although economic growth was slow at 2.9% in the 
financial year (FY) 2019/20, with especially the service and industrial sectors paying the highest 
price, the supportive environment ensured that the industrial sector picked up quickly in the first 
quarter (Q1) of FY2020/21. The roll-out of public works in urban and peri-urban areas was aimed 
at hedging livelihoods against the impact of COVID-19 on households as a result of dampened 
production in the industrial and service sectors. While inflation remained subdued, the reduction 
in aggregate demand and trade disruptions suppressed inflationary pressure on food thereby 
undermining rural incomes and thus perpetuating rural poverty. Even then, the introduction of 
the Emyooga fund 1 and the rolling out of the e-voucher system to 10 additional districts in an 
effort to enhance the distribution of agricultural inputs are attempts to strengthen livelihoods in 
the rural areas in the midst of COVID-19 headwinds. Interest rates were relatively low on account 
of expansionary monetary policy and confidence in Uganda’s financial sector. This was largely 
on account of the Bank of Uganda’s interventions in the financial sector, which ensured a stable 
financial sector albeit with reduced profitability. The external sector was characterised by reduced 
foreign direct investment, tourism receipts and remittances. Overall, the policy interventions 
were inclusive as fiscal policy was both sensitive to the formal and informal sectors (except 
for households in urban, peri-urban and rural settings). Also, monetary and financial sector 
interventions were sensitive to commercial banks, credit institutions and microfinance deposit-
taking institutions implying sensitivity to formal and informal businesses irrespective of size  
and location. 
1 A specialised skills enterprise group.
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Introduction
A regional disaggregation of COVID-19 confirmed cases and deaths shows that the Americas, 
Europe, South-East Asia, East Mediterranean, Africa and Western Pacific have had the highest 
number COVID-19 confirmed cases respectively (see Table 1). As shown in Table 1, Africa has not 
paid the same in human life as compared to the Americas, Europe, South-East Asia and Eastern 
Mediterranean.2 Within the East African Community (EAC), the number of COVID-19 cases and 
deaths have been 190 142 and 2 684 respectively. In Uganda, there have been 40 607 and 331 
COVID-19 cases and deaths respectively. 
Table 1 COVID-19 cases and deaths as of March 19, 2021
Region Cases Deaths
Americas 53 536 387 1 287 792
Europe 41 811 235 919 964
South-East Asia 14 080 960 214 049
Eastern Mediterranean 7 053 434 152 511
Africa 2 974 616 75 410
Western Pacific 1 752 133 30 730
EAC 190 142 2 684
World 121 209 510 2 680 469
Source: World Health Organization, https://covid19.who.int/, 19 March 2021
With regard to Uganda, the adoption of COVID-19 containment measures as early as March 
2020 limited the spread of the virus. Indeed, Figure 1a) shows that Uganda has had two 
COVID-19 peaks, one in September 2020 and another in December 2020. The two peaks coincide 
with the easing of the COVID-19 containment measures in the first instance and the effects of 
the political party primaries in exacerbating the spread of COVID-19 in the second. The second 
peak, which covers the period October to December 16, 2020 (see Figure 1a), shows an increasing 
trend in the number of COVID-19 cases, which can partly be attributed to the general election 
campaign with its limited adherence to the standard operating procedures established by the 
Electoral Commission. Indeed, by December 14, 2020, the seven-day moving average was 719 
infections per day (see Figure 1b). Even then, the human cost of the COVID-19 (in terms of loss 
of lives) in Uganda has been minimal in comparison to other countries within the EAC, such as 
2 Bearing in mind the low intensity of COVID-19 testing in especially Africa, which could perhaps under represent the extent of the virus prevalence.
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Kenya. The roll-out of the COVID-19 inoculation programme started in March 20213 and as of May 
4, 2021, a total of 354 736 vaccine doses had been administered.4 This implies that the human 
cost of COVID-19 is likely to reduce.
Apart from the human cost, COVID-19 has been deleterious to both the global and local 
economies. Uganda is an open economy and, as such, the distortionary effects of COVID-19 
percolate into Uganda’s economy through the external sector. To this end, COVID-19 disruptions 
to international trade in goods and services, and the flow of capital, has implications for 
Uganda’s economy – notwithstanding the added distortionary effects of COVID-19’s containment 
measures. Even then, the Ugandan government, through the Ministry of Finance, Planning and 
Economic Development and the Central Bank of Uganda, adopted expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policies with a view to mitigate the distortionary effect of COVID-19 on livelihoods 
and the private sector respectively. As such, this paper explores the macroeconomic effects 
of COVID-19 on Uganda’s economy, the macroeconomic policy choices undertaken, and the 
inclusiveness and viability of these choices. 
 
3 Joachim Buwendo, “Uganda Launches First Phase of COVID-19 Vaccination Exercise”, March 11, 2021, https://www.unicef.org/uganda/stories/
uganda-launches-first-phase-COVID-19-vaccination-exercise.
4 See WHO, https://covid19.who.int/region/afro/country/ug for the number of vaccine doses administered.
Figure 1a COVID-19 profile in Uganda
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Effects of COVID-19 on the global economy
In the absence of a COVID-19 vaccine, countries around the globe adopted containment 
measures with the rationale of abating the spread of the virus. Global containment measures 
included a combination of: 
• School closures;
• teleworking;
• cancellation of public events, including congregation and entertainment;
• restrictions on the size of gatherings, the number of persons in private cars and internal 
movement;
• closures of public transport, international travel both road and air except for emergencies;
• stay-at-home orders; and 
• night curfews. 
These measures disrupted the global supply chains for goods and services resulting in a global 
recession. While gross domestic product (GDP) growth was 2.8% in 2019, the distortionary  
effect of COVID-19 led to the world economy contracting by -3.3% in 2020 (see Figure 2).  
The contraction was irrespective of the region. For example, emerging markets and developing 
Figure 1b COVID-19 cases, 7-day average
Source: World Health Organization, https://covid19.who.int/, 19 March 2021
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economies, sub-Saharan Africa and advanced economies grew by 3.6%, 3% and 1.6% 
respectively in 2019. With COVID-19, however, emerging markets and developing economies, sub-
Saharan Africa and advanced economies contracted by 2.2%, 2% and 4.7% respectively. 
Within the EAC, the effects of the COVID-19 containment measures partly dampened growth. 
Indeed, while Burundi, Kenya and Rwanda grew by 1.8%, 5.4% and 9.4% respectively in 2019, 
they contracted by 1.3%, 0.1% and 0.2% respectively in 2020. Tanzania’s economy was resilient 
although growth was sluggish: 1% in 2020 compared to the 7% growth rate in 2019. 
Owing to the potential distortionary effect of COVID-19 containment measures, various 
countries adopted expansionary monetary and fiscal policies with varying degrees of intensity 
and extensiveness. Fiscal policy involves tax relief, social safety nets, payment of arrears to 
support liquidity among government service providers and strengthening health systems. The 
effect of the expansionary fiscal regime has come at the cost of increased public debt, especially 
among emerging markets and developing economies. The percentage of GDP public debt 
among emerging markets and developing economies was 60.8% in 2020 compared to 52.1% in 
2019.5 This has consequently increased the risk of debt vulnerability with a number of countries 
defaulting on their debt obligations while the risk of debt stress is on the rise especially among 
5 Peter Nagle and Naotaka Sugawara, “What the Pandemic Means for Government Debt, in Five Charts”, World Bank, January 11, 2021, https://blogs.
worldbank.org/opendata/what-pandemic-means-government-debt-five-charts.
Figure 2 COVID-19 and real gross domestic product growth (%)
Source: IMF, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2021/April, 30 July 2021
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low-income countries.6 With regard to monetary policy, central banks across the globe have 
adopted southward policy movements, quantitative easing and liquidity support in an effort 
to mitigate the impact of COVID-19 on the financial sector and by extension the economy. 
The effect of monetary policy has been to reduce liquidity risk, credit risk and capital risk in the 
financial sector, while inducing the sector to reduce lending rates to the private sector. 
Effects of COVID-19 on Uganda’s economy
Prior to the pandemic, Uganda’s growth outlook was strong following the attainment of 6.2% 
and 6.8% real GDP growth in the 2017/18 and 2018/19 financial years respectively (Figure 3a).  
The strong growth outlook was due to the recovery of the agriculture, industry and services 
sectors. The agriculture sector, for instance, posted 4.4% and 5.4% growth in financial year (FY7) 
2017/18 and 2018/19 respectively, which signalled an economic recovery following a 2.5% average 
growth over the period FY2012/13 to FY2016/17. Similarly, while the industrial sector averaged 
5.5% growth over the FY2012/13 to FY2016/17, it posted 6.5% and 10.1% growth in FY2017/18 
and FY2018/19 – implying strong industrial sector recovery. While services were relatively resilient – 
averaging 4.7% over the FY2012/13 to FY2016/17 period – it equally posted strong growth of 
7.6% and 5.7% in FY2017/18 and FY2018/19 respectively. Consequently, growth was projected at 
6.3% in FY2019/20. Inflation was well anchored with both annualised core inflation and headline 
inflation averaging 3.8% and 3.1% respectively in FY2018/19. Along with being profitable, the 
financial banking sector was stable with capital adequacy, liquidity and credit risk measures well 
above regulatory requirements. Against that background, tax revenue was projected to be 13.5% 
of GDP, a 1.9% increase from tax revenue collected in FY2018/19. 
The external sector was equally well anchored, with Uganda earning a 3.5, 4 and 3.5 percentage 
of GDP from travel (tourism), personal transfers (remittances) and foreign direct investment 
(FDI) respectively in FY2018/19. It is important to note that remittances had passed the $1 billion 
barrier in FY2016/17 and posted 7.6% and 9.3% growth in FY2017/18 and FY2018/19 respectively. 
Similarly, travel had posted $1.2 billion earnings in FY2018/19. With strong foreign exchange 
earnings, Uganda was expected to continue to sustainably finance the current account deficit in 
FY2019/20 and to stabilise the value of the Ugandan shilling (UGX8) against foreign currencies, 
thereby minimising external public debt foreign exchange risk.
This economic outlook was, however, undermined by the unprecedented economic and health 
shock of the COVID-19 pandemic, which was transmitted through both domestic and external 
6 Nagle and Sugawara, “What the Pandemic Means for Government Debt”.
7 FY is financial year and covers the period July to June.
8 UGX is the currency code for the Ugandan shilling.
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transmission channels. The domestic effects involve the mechanisms adopted by the Ugandan 
government to diminish the spread of COVID-19. These included social-distancing measures, 
lockdowns and curfews, international flight suspensions (except for essential/critical deliveries), 
establishment of isolation centres, land border restrictions, a 14-day mandatory quarantine period 
for travellers coming from COVID-19 affected countries, restrictions on domestic travel, insistence 
on teleworking, closure of schools and educational institutions, restrictions on large gatherings, 
restrictions on worship and closure of non-essential business. The effect of these COVID-19 
containment measures was to disrupt supply chains, subdue aggregate demand, reduce 
capacity utilisation, and constrain the tourism, education and entertainment sectors. While the 
containment measures succeeded in containing the spread of COVID-19, they unfortunately 
negated gains made to enhance livelihoods, buffer the financial sector and support job creation. 
In terms of the external transmission channel, shocks in the global economy percolate seamlessly 
into the domestic economy through Uganda’s external sector (due to its open economy). 
Consequently, the global recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic has impacted the 
Ugandan economy by among other things reducing demand for Ugandan exports, reducing 
remittances and reducing tourism receipts due to a reduction in travel, all of which have had 
a negative impact on the country’s foreign exchange earnings. Furthermore, COVID-19 travel 
restrictions adopted by trading partners disrupted the supply of intermediate and capital goods, 
which are key to the industrial sector.
The combination of external and domestic transmission channels resulted in the following:
• Subdued domestic production and consumption,
• increased risks in the financial sector (as the private sector’s ability to finance credit was 
compromised),
• reduced demand for credit,
• reduced taxable income and thus compromised tax revenue collection,
• increased appetite for public debt (to compensate for compromised tax revenue collection) 
and
• distortions in the current, capital and financial accounts. 
As such, the subsequent section maps the effects of COVID-19 on macroeconomic indicators. 
While data is still evolving, this study uses high frequency data available up to February 2021. 
The study captures the period from March 2020 when the distortionary effects of COVID-19 
started manifesting. However, the extent of the economic impact depends on how the outbreak 
continues to evolve within and outside Uganda. 
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Effects of COVID-19 on the real sector
COVID-19 has disrupted economic activities to the extent that growth tapered to 2.9% in 
FY2019/20. The Ugandan economy was gaining momentum following the achievement of 6.2% 
and 6.8% real GDP growth in FY2017/18 and FY2018/19. However, following the disruptions 
brought about by COVID-19, as well as floods and locust invasions,9 growth tapered off to 2.9% 
in FY2019/20 (see Figure 3a). COVID-19 affected demand for exports and disruptions to supply 
chains undermined the flow of goods, services and labour, which resulted in compromised 
economic performance. Specifically, growth in the services sector contracted from 5.7% in 
FY2018/19 to 2.9% in FY2019/20. This was on account of the trade, transport, accommodation, 
education and entertainment subsectors contracting by 2.9%, 1.3%, 8.5%, 4% and 8.7% 
respectively (see Figure 3b). The education, accommodation and entertainment sub-sectors, 
in particular, paid the highest price for the COVID-19 containment measures. For example, the 
closure of education institutions and all borders (except for emergencies), rendered institutions 
of learning, accommodation services, restaurants and the tourism industry out of business or 
underperforming. 
The industrial sector equally registered sluggish GDP growth of 2.2% in FY2019/20 in comparison 
to 10.1% in FY2018/19. The slowdown in the industrial sector was attributed to slow growth in the 
manufacturing, mining and construction subsectors. The manufacturing subsector slowed down 
to 1.3% growth in FY2019/20 compared to 7.8% in FY2018/19. The growth of the construction 
subsector slowed down from 14.2% in FY2018/19 to 3.8% in FY2019/20. The mining subsector 
contracted from 33.4% growth in FY2018/19 to 0.2% in FY2019/20. The agriculture sector 
remained relatively resilient in the midst of the COVID-19 headwinds with growth decreasing by 
0.6% to 4.8% in FY2019/20 (see Figure 3b). The reduction in agriculture performance was driven 
by a substantial decrease in the fishing subsector from 41.4% in FY2018/19 to 1.9% in FY2019/20. 
However, the performance of the agriculture sector was supported by growth of 7.2%, 4.5% and 
7.9% in the cash crops, food crops and livestock subsectors respectively in FY2019/20. 
9 Floods and locust invasions dampened growth in the first half of FY2019/20.
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Figure 3  Dampened economic growth
Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstracts 2018-2021 
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According to various economic indicators, the result of COVID-19 has been sluggish economic 
activity. Indeed, the purchasing managers’ index (PMI) dropped below the threshold of 50 to 
45.3 in March and then dropped even further to 21.6 in April 2020, the lowest it has been since 
inception (see Figure 4a). Even though the PMI improved to reach 41.9 in May, economic actors 
had clearly factored COVID-19 disruptions into their decisions. Also, over the period March to 
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June 2020, the composite index of economic activity (CIEA) annualised growth averaged 0.04% 
compared to 6% over the same period in 2019 (see Figure 4b). Both the CIEA and PMI showed that 
the dampened economic environment in the period March to June 2020 was partly attributed to the 
aggressive COVID-19 containment measures, temporary company closures, subdued demand and 
travel restrictions. Similarly, the business tendency index (BTI), a measure of sentiments by business 
players about the business outlook, dropped below the threshold of 50 for the first time in March 
and stayed below 50 to August 2020 (see Figure 4 Panel a). This implied that the business agents 
were pessimistic about the business outlook on account of COVID-19 containment measures and 
the uncertainty about how fast businesses would recover after the pandemic. 
The COVID-19-induced weak business environment – as revealed by the PMI, CIEA and BTI – is 
consistent with dampened economic growth in Q3 and Q4 of FY2019/20. Indeed, in Q3 and Q4 of 
FY2019/20, the economy contracted by 0.7% and 6.3% respectively. The 8.7% and 9.4% robust 
growth achieved in Q1 and Q2 respectively of FY2019/20 offset the contraction in Q3 and Q4 of 
FY2019/20 so that the economy registered an aggregate 2.9% growth performance in FY2019/20. 
The contraction in Q3 of FY2019/20 was on account of negative growth in the agriculture sector 
where growth tapered off from 9.2% in Q2 FY2019/20 to -3.7% in Q3 FY2019/20 (see Figure 3c). 
Figure 4 Subdued economic activities and weak business sentiment
(a) BTI and PMI (b) CIEA
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The Q3 of FY2019/20 contraction in the agriculture sector 
was driven by -16.1% drop in the food crops subsector. The 
contraction in Q4 of FY2019/20 was on account of a drop 
to -8.8% and -5.5% growth in the industrial and services 
sectors respectively. The reduction in growth to -8.8% in the 
industrial sector was on account of a 30.1%, 11.5%, 6.8% 
and -1.3% growth in the mining, manufacturing, electricity 
and construction subsectors respectively. In addition, the 
achievement of -5.5% growth in the services sector was 
on account of a -6.4%, -8.7%, -45.5%, -2.2%, -39.7%, 
-2.3%, -8.7% and -40.6% growth in trade, transport, 
accommodation, financial, professional, administrative and 
educational services respectively. 
The weak business environment as indicated by disruptions 
in supply chains and the contraction of consumer demand 
has resulted in micro, small and medium scale enterprises 
(MSMEs) exiting business. This is because of the potential 
loss in revenue that is likely to worsen their already vulnerable 
liquidity position – noting that 90% of the private sector 
is dominated by MSMEs spread across all sectors: 49% in 
the services sector; 33% in commerce and trade; 10% in 
manufacturing; and 8% in other fields,10 implying that any 
negative shock to the sector represents a serious threat to 
Uganda’s economy. The most vulnerable sectors among 
MSMEs are the trade and services sub-sector and hotels, bars 
and restaurants. For instance, at least 20% of firms in the 
informal sector are likely to close down and at least 11% of 
informal sector earnings are likely to fall below the national 
poverty line. Yet, this sector employs 85% of the working age 
population outside agriculture. 
Furthermore, informal sector earnings are likely to be 
undermined. Assuming that the working age population 
not engaged in subsistence agriculture is only 13 million,11 an 
estimated 4.4 million informal sector workers are expected to 
10 Uganda Investment Authority, “SMEs Driving the Economy”, April 5, 2016, https://www.uga 
ndainvest.go.ug/smes-driving-economy.
11 Uganda Bureau of Statistics, “National Labour Force Survey 2016/17”.
“At least 20% of firms in the 
informal sector are likely to 
close down and at least 11% 
of informal sector earnings 
are likely to fall below the 
national poverty line. Yet, 
this sector employs 85% of 
the working age population 
outside agriculture”
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experience a contraction in earnings below the poverty line or register no earnings at all 12 – 
potentially resulting in increasing poverty, income inequality and vulnerability.
However, following the gradual easing of the COVID-19 containment measures, both the PMI 
and CIEA picked up. The PMI recovered above the threshold of 50 in July FY2020/21, signalling 
an improving business environment and an increase in output and new orders. Furthermore, 
the CIEA also signalled an improvement in the level of economic activity following the gloomy 
economic prospects in March to May of FY2019/20 with the CIEA hitting the trough at 137 in May 
(see Figure 4b). However, from July13 of FY2020/21, it signalled improving economic conditions 
implying that the level of economic activity was stronger than the period March to May. Similarly, 
business sentiment remained positive. Indeed, the BTI for September, October and November 
of FY2020/21 was 50.7, 51.7 and 50.7 respectively – crossing the threshold of 50 for the first 
time since February of FY2019/20 (see Figure 4a). This suggests that there was increasing and 
persistent optimism in the business community for the first time since March 2020 and that 
the economy is on the path to recovery. Optimism in the economy should further increase with 
the rolling out of COVID-19 inoculations. Unfortunately, only 864 000 doses of the AstraZeneca 
vaccine had been procured at the time of writing, and it is estimated that Uganda needs at least 
45 million doses – especially if the vaccines are to be administered in two doses.14 The improving 
economic conditions are reflected by -2.2% growth in Q1 of FY2020/21 compared to -6.3% in Q4 
of FY2019/20. The improving economic conditions were leveraged by the industrial sector as it 
posted 4.3% growth in Q1 of FY2020/21. The recovery in the industrial sector was on account of 
55.1%, 3%, 3.5% and 4.3% growth in the mining, manufacturing, electricity and water subsectors 
respectively. The growth in the manufacturing sector is attributed to increased production 
in pharmaceutical products, starch products and grain milling.15 The 9.6% contraction in the 
construction subsector undermined what could have been a potentially robust industrial sector 
growth. The relatively strong recovery in the industrial sector given the COVID-19 headwinds was 
offset by -6.2% and -0.2% growth in the services and agriculture sectors respectively. Within the 
services sector, even though trade recovered to 5.9% growth, it was not sufficient to offset the 
effects of the -5.8%, -24.2%, -5.7%, -63.2%, -3.5%, -20.4% and -50.7% growth in transport, 
accommodation, financial, professional, administrative, education and entertainment services 
respectively. The contraction in entertainment, education, financial and administrative services 
worsened in comparison to Q4 of FY2019/20. The contraction in the agriculture sector was on 
12 UN Uganda, “Leaving No One Behind: From COVID-19 Response to Recovery and Resilience-Building – Analyses of the Socioeconomic Impact of 
COVID-19 in Uganda”, Policy Brief, June 2020.
13 This is because in the month of June 2020, government allowed public transportation, and re-opened non-food stores (except those located in 
arcades), hotels and food restaurants. In addition, in the month of July, government further allowed 110 out of 171 arcades, saloons and boda bodas 
to go back to business subject to strict standard operating procedures.
14 Ministry of Health, “Update on COVID-19 vaccination in Uganda”, March 2, 2021, https://www.health.go.ug/cause/update-on-covid-19-
vaccination-in-uganda/.
15 Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, “Half Year Macroeconomic & Fiscal Performance Report Financial Year 2020/21”, February 
2021, https://www.finance.go.ug/sites/default/files/Publications/Half Year Macroeconomic%26 Fiscal Performance Report Feb 2021.pdf.
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account of -0.1%, -3.8%, -7.7% and -18.4% growth in the food crops, fishing, and forestry and 
agriculture support services subsectors respectively. Cash crops and livestock registered 2.5% and 
7.4% growth thereby offsetting the extent of contraction in the agriculture sector. 
Inflation has largely been subdued. Annual headline inflation averaged 3.3% and 4.1% over the 
periods March to June of FY2019/20 and July to February of FY2020/21 respectively (see Figure 5). 
The subdued headline inflation was on account of food crops inflation averaging -2.2% and 5.7% 
over the periods March to June of FY2019/20 and July to February of FY2020/21 respectively. 
The further reduction in food crops inflation was on account of dampened demand coupled 
with excess supply especially given that COVID-19 induced disruptions undermined the export 
of agriculture produce.16 Price reductions were mainly restricted to food crops such as matooke, 
sweet potatoes, cassava, fruits (bananas, pineapples and papaya), as well as vegetables 
(tomatoes, onions and garlic).17 Consequently, food crops inflation offset the effect of the  
(on average) 8.2% energy fuel and utilities inflation over the period March to June of FY2019/20 
on headline inflation. Nevertheless, energy fuel and utilities inflation was subdued in the period 
July to February of FY2020/21 averaging 1.9% on account of a decrease in the price of domestic 
liquid fuels (petrol, diesel, paraffin and liquefied gas) as international oil prices remained low.18 
Core inflation picked up from an average of 3.5% over the period March to June of FY2019/20 to 
5.6% in the period to February of FY2020/21. The increase in core inflation was on account of an 
increase in transport costs due to COVID-19 induced travel restrictions.19 However, core inflation 
remained within the Bank of Uganda’s target of 2% and 8%.
16 For example, annualised maize exports slumped from 199% and 184% growth in January and February of 2020 respectively to 50%, 9%, 36% 
and 41% growth in March, April, May and June of 2020 respectively. Similarly, annualised growth in exports of beans slumped from 154.3%, 17.7% 
and 61.1% growth in November 2019, December 2019 and January 2020 respectively to -44%, -47% and -82% growth in February, March and 
April respectively. Also, the annualised exports of fruits and vegetables reduced from 53%, 18.3% and 22.2% in December 2019, January 2020 and 
February 2020 to 4% and -20.1% in March and April respectively of 2020.
17 Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, “Half Year Macroeconomic & Fiscal Performance Report Financial Year 2020/21”.
18 Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, “Half Year Macroeconomic & Fiscal Performance”.
19 Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, “Half Year Macroeconomic & Fiscal Performance”.
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Effects of COVID-19 on the monetary sector
Owing to the need to boost economic growth in the midst 
of COVID-19 headwinds, the Ugandan government adopted 
an aggressive and persistent monetary policy framework. 
This has been characterised by the central bank rate (CBR) 
reducing from 9% in March 2020 to 8% in April 2020, and 
then a further reduction to 7% in June 2020 (see Figure 6a). 
The 7% CBR is the lowest it has been since its inception. In 
addition to lowering the CBR, the Bank of Uganda provided 
for a regulatory framework that enabled financial institutions 
to have adequate capital buffers while minimising liquidity 
and credit risks in the financial system. In turn, commercial 
lending rates dropped from 19.1% in February 2020 to 
17.8% and 17.7% in March and April 2020 on account of the 
accommodative monetary policy and subdued demand for 
credit. The interest rate of 17.7% is the lowest lending rates 
that Uganda has seen since June 2018. However, lending 
rates picked up shortly afterwards peaking at 20.9% in July 
2020 and later tapering off even further to 17.4% in January 
“Owing to the need to 
boost economic growth 
in the midst of COVID-19 
headwinds, the Ugandan 
government adopted an 
aggressive and persistent 
monetary policy framework”
Figure 5 Inflation has been subdued 
Source: Bank of Uganda, https://www.bou.or.ug/bou/bouwebsite/Statistics/Statistics.html, 30 July 2021
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2021. While historically low in a Ugandan context, lending rates remain high on account of other 
structural rigidities in the financial sector especially operational costs and the risk averseness of 
creditors. 
Private sector credit (PSC) growth has largely been weak, in particular for the period between 
February and July 2020 (see Figure 6b). This was on account of subdued demand for credit 
following the shutdown of the economy and risk averseness of creditors. The contraction in 
credit availed to the private sector was evident in manufacturing, trade and agriculture sectors, 
where the average annualised growth in commercial bank credit was 7%, 2% and 2% over the 
period March to December 2020 (see Figure 6c). Compared to the average annualised growth in 
commercial bank credit of 17%, 18% and 11% to the manufacturing, trade and agriculture sectors 
respectively over the same period in 2019, this implies a significant contraction in commercial 
bank credit among the aforementioned sectors. However, while the manufacturing and 
agriculture sectors post-September 2020 started picking up in terms of commercial bank credit 
uptake following the easing of COVID-19 containment measures, the commercial bank credit 
growth to the trade sector is still negative. 
Figure 6 Interest rates and private sector credit 
(a) Interest rate profile (b) Weak credit demand coupled with  
risk averse creditors
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Effects of COVID-19 on the financial sector
The financial sector was resilient albeit with reduced 
profitability. Given the COVID-19 disruptions, the 
fundamental role of the financial sector was to ‘keep the 
lights on’ through undertaking a financial intermediation 
function. However, given the COVID-19 headwinds, the 
financial sector needed support from the Bank of Uganda. 
As such, the bank not only revised the central bank rate 
downwards but also extended credit and liquidity relief 
measures to the financial sector. Consequently, the financial 
sector remained resilient although with reduced profitability. 
For example, as at Q2 of 2020/21, the banking sector’s 
capital to risk-weighted assets was 22.15% in comparison to 
21.78% and 21.9% during Q2 and Q3 of 2019/20 respectively 
(see Table 1), which are all above the minimum regulatory 
requirement of 10%. Also, among microfinance deposit-taking 
institutions (MDIs) and credit institutions (CIs), capital to 
risk-weighted assets were 35.4% and 16.1% respectively as at 
Q2 2020/21, which are equally above the minimum regulatory 
requirement of 15% and 10% respectively (see Table 1). 
“The financial sector needed 
support from the Bank of 
Uganda. As such, the bank 
not only revised the central 
bank rate downwards but 
also extended credit and 
liquidity relief measures 
to the financial sector. 
Consequently, the financial 
sector remained resilient 
although with reduced 
profitability”
Source: Bank of Uganda, https://www.bou.or.ug/bou/bouwebsite/Statistics/Statistics.html, 30 July 2021
(c) Sectoral growth of commercial credit (annualised)
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Similarly, asset quality measured by the non-performing loans 
(NPLs) to the total gross loans ratio initially deteriorated from 
4.85% in Q2 of 2019/20 to 5.41% and 6.01% in Q3 and Q4 of 
2019/20. It tapered off to 5.15% in Q1 of 2020/21. Although asset 
quality deteriorated in Q2 2020/21 as the NPLs to total gross 
loans ratio increased to 5.27%, these are still lower than the 
NPLs to total gross loans ratio of 5.41% in Q3 of 202/21. However, 
asset quality deteriorated by 2.25 and 1.76 times among CIs and 
MDIs. At Q2 of 2019/20, NPLs to total gross loans ratio among 
CIs was 3.6%, and at Q2 of 2020/21 NPLs to total gross loans 
ratio was 8.1%. Also, among MDIs, as at Q2 of 2019/20 NPLs to 
total gross loans ratio was 3.6%, and at Q2 of 2020/21, the NPLs 
to total gross loans ratio was 6.3%. This implies that the asset 
quality deteriorated more among MDIs and CIs as compared 
to commercial banks. Even so, the moderate rise in the NPLs to 
total gross loans ratio over the COVID-19 period is on account 
of the Bank of Uganda’s credit relief intervention, which allowed 
supervised financial institutions (SFIs) to restructure loans of 
distressed businesses and households, thereby protecting their 
asset quality within the banking sector. 
Regarding banking sector liquidity as measured by the liquid 
assets to total deposits ratio, it increased from 48.58% in Q2 of 
2019/20 to 50.65 as at Q2 of 2020/21. Among CIs, liquid assets 
to total deposits ratio increased from 48.4% as at Q2 2019/20 to 
59% as at Q2 of 2020/21. While among MDIs liquidity contracted 
1.84 times, from 60.7% as at Q2 of 2019/20 to 32.9 as at Q2 
2020/21. Overall, while MDIs experienced a reduction in liquidity, 
liquidity risks are still minimal given that the liquidity ratio is well 
above the 15% regulatory requirement. With regard to CIs and 
commercial banks, liquidity in both cases was well above the 
regulatory minimum of 20%. The enhanced resilience to liquidity 
shocks across CIs and commercial banks was on account of the 
Bank of Uganda’s monetary and macro-prudential policy actions 
– build-up of deposits driven by fiscal expansion, and increased 
investment in government securities amidst COVID-19 induced 
risk averseness to private sector lending.20 
20 Bank of Uganda, “Financial Stability Review”, 2002, https://www.bou.or.ug/bou/bouwebsite/
FinancialStability/StabilityReview.html.
“The moderate rise in 
the non-performing 
loans to total gross 
loans ratio over the 
COVID-19 period is on 
account of the Bank of 
Uganda’s credit relief 
intervention, which 
allowed supervised 
financial institutions  
to restructure loans of 
distressed businesses 
and households, thereby 
protecting their asset 
quality within the 
banking sector”
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Nevertheless, financial sector profitability has tailed off. 
Profitability as measured by a return on assets (ROA) and 
return on equity (ROE) both deteriorated. Specifically, ROA 
declined from 2.9% in Q2 of 2019/20 to 2.76%, 2.58% and 
2.38% in the quarters ending March, June and December 
2020 respectively (see Table 2). Among CIs, ROA declined 
from 0.1% in Q2 of 2019/20 to -0.8% December 2020. With 
regard, MDIs ROA declined from 2.9% in Q2 of 2019/20 to 
2.7% in the quarter to December 2020. Also, the ROE declined 
from 16.74% in Q2 of 2019/20 to 15.89%, 15.24%, 15.12% 
and 14.25% in the quarters ending March, June, September 
and December 2020 respectively within the commercial 
banking sector. Among CIs, ROE declined from 0.3% as at 
Q2 of 2019/20 to -0.5%, -3.9% and -5.4% in the quarters 
ending June, September and December 2020. With regard 
to MDIs however, ROE improved from 9.5% in Q2 of 2019/20 
to 10% in Q2 of 2020/21. The reduction in bank profitability 
reflects a subdued business environment. Indeed, overall, the 
commercial bank sector annual net-after-tax profit declined 
by 4.6% from UGX 883.4 billion ($241.0 million) in 2019 to 
UGX 844.3 billion ($231.3 million) in the year to 2020, while 
MDIs registered a 288% increase in aggregate net-after-tax 
profit from UGX 5.1 billion ($1.4 million) in year 2019 to UGX 
19.8 billion ($5.4 million) in the year to 2020. However, CIs 
incurred losses in the year to 2020 with a consolidated loss 
to the tune of UGX 8.7 billion ($2.4 million) from a profitable 
position of UGX 1.5 billion ($0.4 million) for the year 2019.21
In spite of the reduced financial sector profitability, the 
financial sector has been resilient as measured by asset 
quality, liquidity and capital adequacy. So far, the central 
bank’s interventions have successfully cushioned the sector 
from the COVID-19 headwinds.
21 Bank of Uganda, “Financial Stability Review”.
“In spite of the reduced 
financial sector profitability, 
the financial sector has been 
resilient as measured by 
asset quality, liquidity and 
capital adequacy. So far, the 
central bank’s interventions 
have successfully cushioned 
the sector from the 
COVID-19 headwinds”
21 Efficacy of COVID-19 Macroeconomic Policy Responses in Uganda
Table 2 Selected financial sector soundness indicators (quarterly)
Indicator Dec-19 Mar-20 Jun-20 Sep-20 Dec-20
Capital adequacy (%)
Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets
Commercial banks 21.78 21.90 22.70 22.51 22.15
CIs 22.0 23.5 24.0 22.0 17.3
MDIs 40.1 41.7 39.4 38.6 38.1
Asset quality (%)
NPLs to total gross loans
Commercial banks 4.85 5.41 6.01 5.15 5.27
CIs 3.6 4.2 7.6 5.3 8.1
MDIs 3.6 4.1 10.8 9 6.3
Earnings & profitability (%)
Return on assets (ROA)
Commercial banks 2.90 2.76 2.58 2.58 2.38
CIs 0.1 0.2 -0.1 -0.7 -0.8
MDIs 2.9 3.1 -1.4 2.6 2.7
Return on equity (ROE)
Commercial Banks 16.74 15.89 15.24 15.12 14.25
CIs 0.3 0.9 -0.5 -3.9 -5.4
MDIs 9.5 10.3 -4.7 9.3 10
Liquidity (%)
Liquid assets to total deposits
Commercial banks 48.58 48.81 49.14 48.77 50.65
CIs 48.4 54.9 57.1 57 59
MDIs 60.7 31.9 34.1 32.7 32.9
Source: Bank of Uganda, https://www.bou.or.ug/bou/bouwebsite/Statistics/Statistics.html, 30 July 2021
Effects of COVID-19 on the external sector
Current account deficit as a percentage of GDP improved from 7% in FY2018/19 to 6% in 
FY2019/20. This was on account of COVID-19 induced disruptions in the supply chain of goods 
and services. As such, imports of goods as a percentage of GDP contracted from 19.9 in 
FY2018/19 to 16.8 in FY2019/19 (see Table 3). Indeed, month-on-month growth in imports was 
6.9%, -10.3% and -32% in February, March and April respectively of FY2019/20. Similarly, exports 
of goods contracted by 1.1% of GDP in FY2019/20. Specifically, in FY2019/20 month-on-month 
growth in exports was -7.7%, -11.4% and -34.3% in February, March and April respectively. 
Furthermore, the trade in services deficit as a percentage of GDP worsened from 1% in FY2018/19 
to 2.8% in FY2019/20. This was partly on account of a reduction in tourism receipts from 3.5% of 
GDP in FY2018/19 to 2.4% of GDP in FY2019/20. Consequently, the trade deficit as a percentage 
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of GDP contracted from 9.4 in FY2018/19 to 9.3 in FY2019/20. However, the net income of 3.3% 
of GDP could not finance the trade deficit in FY2019/20 resulting in the current account deficit of 
6% of GDP. Nevertheless, the current account deficit is manageable partly on account of net FDI 
inflows and capital transfers of 2.6% and 0.2% of GDP respectively.
Table 3 Balance of payments statement as percentage of GDP
Indicator 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20
Current account -5.3 -7.0 -6.0
Trade in goods and services (net) -7.3 -9.4 -9.3
Trade in goods (net) -6.4 -8.3 -6.4
Exports of goods 10.8 11.5 10.4
o/w coffee 1.5 1.2 1.4
Imports of goods -17.1 -19.9 -16.8
o/w oil imports 2.8 2.8 2.3
Trade in services (net) -0.9 -1.0 -2.8
o/w travel (net) 2.7 3.5 2.4
o/w transport (net) -3.5 -4.1 -3.3
Incomes (net) 2.0 2.4 3.3
Primary income (net) -2.8 -2.7 -1.7
o/w public interest payments (debit) -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
Secondary income (net) 4.8 5.1 4.9
Personal transfers (net) 3.8 4.0 3.6
NGO transfers (net) 1.2 1.3 1.5
Capital account 0.3 0.3 0.2
Net borrowing (balance from current and capital a/c) -5.0 -6.7 -5.8
Financial account 3.4 7.1 5.7
o/w direct investment 2.8 3.5 2.6
o/w portfolio investment -1.0 -0.5 -0.9
Other investment (net) 1.6 4.0 3.8
o/w government loans (net) 3.2 3.4 4.7
Disbursements 3.9 4.1 5.2
Repayments -0.7 -0.7 -0.5
Net errors and omissions 1.0 -0.2 1.9
Overall balance 0.5 -0.2 -1.7
Financing -0.5 0.2 1.7
Central bank net reserves (-increase) -0.5 0.2 1.7
GDP at current prices ($ millions) 32 772.82 34 387.23 36 645.69
Gross international reserves in months of imports 4.2 4.3 5.2
Note: o/w stands for ‘of which’
Source: Bank of Uganda, https://www.bou.or.ug/bou/bouwebsite/Statistics/Statistics.html, 30 July 2021 
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Personal transfers play an integral role in mitigating the size of the trade in goods and services 
deficit. However, owing to COVID-19 these contracted to 0.4% of GDP. Personal transfers 
as a percentage of GDP reduced from 4% in FY2018/19 to 3.6% in FY2019/20 (see Table 1).22 
Specifically, personal transfers reduced from $481.82 million in Q2 of 2019/20 to $287.58 million 
and $186.72 million in the quarters ending March and June respectively. The personal transfers of 
$186.72 million in Q3 of 2019/20 is the lowest personal transfers have been since Q4 of 2014/15. 
The contraction in personal transfers is on account of the global economic slowdown partly 
attributed to COVID-19. 
Both FDI and capital transfers contracted in FY2019/20. FDI and capital transfers are critical in 
financing Uganda’s current account deficit. Indeed, in FY2019/20 both FDI and capital transfers 
financed 46.7% of the current account deficit. However, FDI in FY2019/20 as a percentage of 
GDP reduced by 0.9 to 3.5% in FY2018/19. Specifically, FDI reduced from $284.92 million in Q2 
of 2019/20 to $217.17 million, and $178.96 million and $209.51 million in the quarters ending 
March, June and September respectively. Indeed, FDI in Q4 of 2019/20 is the lowest FDI recorded 
since Q2 of 2016/17, when Uganda received $156.35 million in FDI. Similarly capital transfers as 
a percentage of GDP reduced from 0.3 in FY2018/19 to 0.2 in FY2019/20. Specifically, capital 
transfers reduced from $32.57 million in Q2 of 2019/20 to $16.16 million, $8.75 million and $33.52 
million in the quarters ending March, June and September respectively. In Q4 of 2019/20, capital 
transfers received are the lowest capital transfers have been since Q4 of 2012/13, when Uganda 
received $5.24 million in capital transfers. The contraction in both capital transfers and FDI is 
on account of the global economic slowdown that is partly attributed to COVID-19. Noting, 
however, that even though both FDI and capital transfers contracted in FY2019/20, they partly 
mitigated the vulnerability associated with Uganda’s relatively sizeable current account deficit in 
FY2019/20 and contributed to the build-up of the central bank foreign exchange reserves. 
Trade in services deficit increased on account of a contraction in tourism receipts. Tourism 
receipts as a percentage of GDP reduced from 3.5 in FY2018/19 to 2.4 in FY2019/20. Specifically, 
tourism receipts reduced from $312.71 million in Q2 of 2019/20 to $237.54 million, $0.00 million 
and $42.29 million in the quarters ending March, June and September respectively. Tourism 
earnings are the lowest since Q4 of 2009/10, when Uganda earned $62.46 million. The slowdown 
in tourism earnings is on account of the COVID-19 induced closure of Uganda’s airspace to travel 
except for emergencies. 
Against the US dollar, the Ugandan shilling depreciated sharply but then recovered owing to 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) debt. At the onset of the COVID-19-induced trade and 
services disruptions, the UGX depreciated against the $ from UGX 3 676.8 in February to UGX 
22 Personal transfer consists of all current transfers in cash or in kind made or received by resident households to or from non-resident households. 
Personal transfers include workers’ remittances, but are not confined to transfers within families and income from employment. 
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3 772.9, UGX 3 785.9 and UGX 3 791.5 in March, April and May of 2020 respectively (see Figure 7). 
The depreciation of the Ugandan shilling against the US dollar was on account of reduced 
forex inflows because exports and tourism receipts were choked off by the country’s COVID-19 
containment measures. Furthermore, as investors sought a safer investment destination, this 
resulted in capital outflow, which led to further depreciation of the UGX. However, both the IMF 
and World Bank COVID-19 emergency funding were instrumental in stabilising the UGX against 
the US dollar, along with the Bank of Uganda’s strong commitment to maintaining foreign 
exchange market stability. 
The months of import cover improved partly due to the IMF loan. Owing to the contraction of 
export, tourism, personal transfer and FDI receipts, the reserves equally ran low from 4.6 months 
of import cover in February 2020 to 4.1 months of import cover in May 2020, which is lower than 
the 4.5 EAC months of import cover threshold (see Figure 8). However, following the IMF loan, 
reserves recovered to 5.2 months of import cover in June 2020. Indeed, the months of import 
cover have averaged 5.1 over the period June 2020 to January 2021. 
Effects of COVID-19 on the fiscal sector
Fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP increased by 2.5 in FY2019/20 compared to FY2018/19.  
The fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP increased from 5 in FY2018/19 to 7.5 in FY2019/20 
Figure 7 UGX depreciation on COVID-19 headwinds 
Source: Bank of Uganda, https://www.bou.or.ug/bou/bouwebsite/Statistics/Statistics.html, 30 July 2021
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(see Table 4). The increase in the fiscal deficit was partly on account of government spending 
as percentage of GDP increasing from 18.9 in FY2018/19 to 21.2 in FY2019/20. The increase in 
government spending was partly on account of COVID-19 and locust invasion shocks.23 Yet 
tax revenue collection fell from 12.4% of GDP in FY2018/19 to 11.6% of GDP in FY2019/20, a 
contraction of 0.8% of GDP. Similarly, grants as a percentage of GDP reduced from 0.9 in 
FY2018/19 to 0.6 in FY2019/20. The reduction in tax revenue collection is partly on account of 
COVID-19 containment and tax policy relief measures. Indeed, annualised tax revenue growth 
was dampened throughout the period March, April, May and June of FY2019/20 growing by 0.2%, 
-25.7%, -30.6% and -15.9% respectively (see Figure 9). Specifically, domestic taxes on a month-
on-month basis contracted by -70.6% and -12% in April and May respectively. This was partly 
on account of subdued VAT collections, which on a month-on-month basis grew by -7.33%, 
-22% and -10.4% in the months of March, April and May respectively of FY2019/20 – at the peak 
of COVID-19 containment measures. Also owing to COVID-19 restrictions on the international 
movement of goods and services, international taxes in the months of March and April of 
FY2019/20 contracted, growing on a month-on-month basis by -7.4% and -43.5% respectively. 
Specifically, VAT grew by -9% and -41% in March and April of FY2019/20 respectively. Excise 
duty grew by -6% and -45% respectively over the same period. Also withholding tax grew by 
- 27.8% and -33.5% in March and April of FY2019/20 respectively. Consequently, tax revenue as a 
percentage of GDP was 1.9 lower than the 13.5 budgeted tax revenue in FY2019/20.
23 Locusts invaded eastern Uganda in 2020 resulting in regeneration of rangelands and delaying the starting of the planting season thereby increasing 
likelihood of food poverty, malnutrition and cattle rustling (see https://reliefweb.int/report/uganda/faqs-uganda-emergency-desert-locust-
response-project).
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Figure 8 Months of import cover
Source: Bank of Uganda, https://www.bou.or.ug/bou/bouwebsite/Statistics/Statistics.html, 30 July 2021
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COVID-19 spending amounted to 0.2% of GDP. The fiscal deficit was partly on account of 
COVID-19 induced spending, which was 0.2% of GDP. This spending was partly aimed at 
strengthening the health sector in preparation for COVID-19 patients, supporting livelihoods 
following the economy-wide lockdown and improvements to security. This contributed to 
recurrent spending of 0.5% of GDP and higher than planned recurrent spending of 11% of GDP. 
Even so, overall government spending was 2.4% lower than the planned spending of 23.6% of 
GDP in FY2019/20. This was partly on account of COVID-19 undermining externally-financed 
development spending, which turned out to be 3.7% lower than the planned development 
spending of 6.3% of GDP. 
The fiscal deficit was partly financed by World Bank and IMF loans. As a percentage of GDP, 
the fiscal deficit was financed using external and domestic financing to the tune of 3.9 and 2.2 
respectively. However, owing to COVID-19, government opted for emergency IMF and World Bank 
financing, which resulted in deficit financing of 0.8% of GDP and 0.4% of GDP respectively. 
The stock of public debt increased from $12.55 billion in FY2018/19 to $15.27 billion in FY2019/20, 
a 21.7% increase. As a percentage of GDP, public sector debt rose from 35.3 in FY2018/19 to  
41 in FY 2019/20. Specifically, external debt increased by 25.1% from $8.35 billion in FY2018/19 to 
$10.45 billion in FY2019/20. Domestic debt, on the other hand, increased by 14.8% from $4.20 
billion to $4.82 billion. The increase in public debt in FY2019/20 was on account of COVID-19 
disruptions to the economy and the subsequent containment measures, which resulted in a 
Figure 9 Tax revenue performance
Source: Uganda Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, Monthly Performance of the Economy Report April 2021, 
https://www.finance.go.ug/sites/default/files/Publications/April%202021%20Performance%20of%20the%20Economy%20Report_0.pdf
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revenue shortfall. Furthermore, the respective emergency measures to shore up the health sector 
and protect livelihoods among the vulnerable segment of society in the midst of a revenue 
shortfall resulted in increased public debt uptake. 
Table 4 Fiscal Sector Indications (% of GDP)
FY2017/18 FY2018/19 FY2019/20 Proj FY2019/20 budget
REVENUE & GRANTS 12.7 13.9 13.6 16.1
Revenue 12.1 13.0 12.9 14.7
Tax 11.5 12.4 11.6 13.5
International taxes 0.4 0.7 1.2 – 
Income taxes 4.7 4.7 4.8 – 
Excises 2.8 2.9 3.0 – 
VAT 4.2 4.3 4.5 – 
Non-tax revenue 0.6 0.5 1.3 1.2
Grants 0.6 0.9 0.6 1.4
EXPENDITURE and NET LENDING 16.9 18.9 21.2 23.6
Recurrent expenditure 9.1 9.6 11.5 11.0
Wages and salaries 2.9 3.3 3.6 3.3
Interest payments 1.9 2.0 2.7 2.3
other recurrent spending 4.3 4.4 5.2 5.4
o/w COVID-related spending 0.0 0.0 0.2 –
Development Expenditure 6.3 7.8 8.4 11.8
External 2.7 3.2 2.6 6.3
Domestic 3.6 4.6 5.8 5.5
o/w COVID-related spending – – – – 
Net lending and investment 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.6
o/w COVID-related spending – – 0.4 –
infrastructure projects 1.1 1.0 0.4 – 
Central bank recapitalisation 0.0 0.0 0.2  –
Other spending 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Clearance of domestic arrears 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
o/w COVID-related spending – – – – 
OVERALL BALANCE -4.1 -5.0 -7.6 -7.5
Primary balance -2.2 -3.0 -4.9 – 
FINANCING 4.0 5.0 6.1 7.5
External financing (net) 3.0 2.7 3.9 5.3
Domestic financing (net) 1.1 2.2 2.2 2.2
Other financing – –– 1.5 – 
World Bank – – 0.8 – 
IMF – – 0.4 – 
Other budget support – – 0.3 – 
Note: o/w stands for ‘of which’ 
Source: World Bank, “Uganda Economic Update, 15th Edition: Digital Solutions in a Time of Crisis”, July 2020, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/
en/775621594292073824/pdf/Uganda-Economic-Update-Fifteenth-Edition.pdf
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Consequently, COVID-19 has induced public debt vulnerability, especially with regard to external 
debt. This is because the present value of external debt to exports ratio is expected to increase 
from 125.8% in FY2019/20 to 170.1% in FY2020/21 and further to 185.4% in FY2022/23 (see Table 
5). This implies that any shock in exports is likely to undermine Uganda’s debt sustainability since 
they are a source of foreign exchange earnings, which are critical for external debt repayments. It 
is important that measures are in place to bolster exports. Furthermore, the external debt service 
to revenue is below the low-income country debt sustainability framework threshold over the 
projection period, but is increasing – for example, in FY2022/23, it will be 11.7%. This implies that 
external debt service costs are growing at a higher rate than domestic revenue in the medium 
term. This is likely to increase the risk of resource reallocation from welfare enhancing sectors 
to debt service. Now more than ever, the government ought to prioritise domestic revenue 
mobilisation and better allocate public funds to productive sectors with the ability to increase 
productivity to boost revenue mobilisation. 
Table 5 Public debt sustainability indicators (%)
Low-income 
country debt 
sustainability 
thresholds
18/19 19/20 20/21 21/22 22/23 23/24 24/25 25/26
Nominal debt to GDP  35.3 41 49.9 52.4 54.1 53.4 51.3 48.2
Present value (PV) of debt to GDP 55 26.7 31.8 39.3 41.7 42.9 42.3 40.7 38.2
PV of external debt to GDP 40 15.4 18.8 22.5 24 25.5 25.6 25.3 24.3
PV of external debt to exports 180 89.8 125.8 170.1 170.2 185.4 194.1 191.3 183.9
External debt service to exports 15 7.8 6.7 7.8 9.4 11.6 13.6 13.6 15.1
External debt service to revenue 18 10.3 8 8.1 10 11.7 12.7 11.8 11.9
Source: Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, “Debt Sustainability Report 2019/20”, https://www.finance.go.ug/sites/default/files/
Publications/DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS REPORT DECEMBER 2020_FINAL.pdf
The increased uptake of commercial loans has induced a 0.9% increase in international reserve 
requirements to fulfil short-term debt maturities. Owing to the increased uptake of commercial 
loans, which are typically characterised by shorter grace periods, international reserves to meet 
short-term debt maturities have increased from 5.6% in June 2019 to 6.5% in June 2020. This 
implies that the exchange rate risk is growing on account of the increase in external public debt 
as a proportion of total public debt from 66.5% in FY2018/19 to 68.5% in FY2019/20. 
The private sector crowding-out effect of public domestic debt increased by 3.1%. Public 
domestic debt stock to PSC ratio increased from 102.8% in FY2018/19 to 105.9% in FY2019/20 
(see Table 6). This implies increasing competition from the public sector for credit in the domestic 
29 Efficacy of COVID-19 Macroeconomic Policy Responses in Uganda
credit market, which undermines the ability of the private sector to access low-cost credit. 
Furthermore, domestic interest payments as a proportion of domestic revenue increased from 
12.1% in FY2018/19 to 13.7% in FY2019 – a 1.6% increase. This means that domestic debt financing 
is undermining resource allocation to the welfare enhancing sectors of the economy, which could 
potentially result in compromised service delivery and poverty alleviation. 
Table 6 Domestic debt sustainability benchmarks (%)
Benchmark 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 
Domestic interest/domestic 
revenue (excluding grants) <12.5 10.6 12.8 15.1 13.3 12.1 13.7
Domestic interest/total 
government expenditure <10 7.4 8.8 11.2 9.6 8.3 8.3
Total debt service/domestic 
revenue – 14.4 17.3 21.1 21.2 22.4 21.7
Total debt service/total 
government expenditure – 10.1 11.9 15.7 15.2 15.3 13.2
Public domestic debt stock/
private sector credit – 85.1 95 95.7 99.9 102.8 105.9
External debt service to revenue 18 10.3 8 8.1 10 11.7 12.7
Note: Total debt service does not include domestic debt amortisation
Source: Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, “Debt Sustainability Report 2019/20”, https://www.finance.go.ug/sites/default/files/
Publications/DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS REPORT DECEMBER 2020_FINAL.pdf
Policy responses to COVID-19
COVID-19 institutional response structure
The first COVID-19 case in Uganda was recorded on March 22, 2020, 11 days after the WHO had 
declared the disease a global pandemic. Even so, prior to Uganda recording its first COVID-19 
case, the Ministry of Health developed the national COVID-19 preparedness plan (January-June 
2020) with technical support from the WHO. From this, an implementation plan was developed 
with the following actions: 
• Activating the national task force and the district task forces, and engaging the Presidency 
and the Office of the Prime Minister; 
• activating the incident management system and the emergency operational centre; 
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• heightening health surveillance, active case search, contact tracing, and following up with 
high-risk travellers;
• designating three hospitals to manage COVID-19 cases and building capacity of all the 15 
regional referral hospitals to manage the cases; 
• ramping up the capacity to diagnose cases at the Uganda Virus Research Institute; and 
• producing and disseminating education and communication materials, and various guidelines 
including for mass gatherings and clinical management. 
Also, a COVID-19 response committee was set up to give strategic direction on how best to 
contain the virus. Consequently, before reporting a first case of COVID-19, preventive measures 
were in place, which among others included: screening all incoming travellers at ports of 
entries; training and preparing health workers; and repurposing hospitals in preparation for a 
surge in COVID-19 cases. In addition, travellers from countries that were deemed high risk were 
required to be quarantined on arrival. These measures played a key role in delaying the spread of 
COVID-19. However, the travel restrictions were the starting point towards undermining the flow 
of tourism receipts. Indeed, as COVID-19 cases picked up and the government closed all borders 
(including Entebbe International Airport) except for emergencies, it literally brought the tourism 
sector to a standstill to the extent that there were no earnings in Q4 of 2019/20. The lockdown of 
the tourism subsector also put at risk 605 500 workers24 who eke out a living from the subsector, 
thus further choking off domestic consumption.25 The closure of indoor activities, including gyms, 
casinos, cinemas, and gaming centres and hotels and restaurants implied that complimentary 
services of the tourism sector were equally halted. 
Furthermore, the requirement that truck drivers needed COVID-19 clearance (plus additional 
restrictions26) caused unnecessary delays at ports of entry thereby disrupting the delivery of 
intermediate and capital goods, which undermined industrial sector performance. The sector 
contracted by 8.8% in Q4 of FY2019/20 with specifically the manufacturing subsector shrinking 
by -11.5%. The contraction in the industrial sector was further compounded by the suspension 
of public transport and non-essential sectors. Also border entry delays undermined the trade 
24 This includes 229 000 persons directly employed by the tourism industry (that is hotels, travel agents, airlines and other passenger transportation 
services, excluding commuter services).
25 Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, “Budget Framework Paper FY2019/20: Sector-Tourism”, https://budget.go.ug/sites/
default/files/SectorBudget Docs/2019-2020_SectorBFP_19_Tourism_12_5_20184_45_18PM.pdf.
26 Owing to increased COVID-19 positive test results among cross border truck drivers, especially via the Uganda-Kenya and Uganda-Tanzania border, 
the government came up with new restrictions involving the testing of truck drivers: each transit truck must have one driver for four weeks after 
which relay driving would commence; seclusion and health check points were categorically defined. Mandatory border health checks resulted in the 
Mombasa-Kampala border clearance time increased by 50%. This, along with other mandatory health check points in Uganda, resulted in a round 
trip between Mombasa and Kampala increasing from three days to two weeks. Although such measures were prudent in an attempt to abate and 
contain the spread of COVID-19 by avoiding transit drivers being super spreaders, the Ugandan industrial sector suffered due to delays in input 
supply. 
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subsector resulting in -3.4% and -6.4 growth in Q3 and Q4 of 
FY2019/20. 
While the subsequent easing of COVID-19 containment 
measures was a sigh of relief to the economy, the 
requirement to observe standard operating procedures still 
ensured that the cost of doing business remained high. For 
example, in the public transport service the need to observe 
these procedures resulted in an increase in transport costs. 
Indeed, the observed core inflationary pressure post-June 
2020 is attributed to the COVID-19 induced transport fare 
increases. 
Overall, while the distortionary effect of COVID-19 
containment measures on the economy are unprecedented, 
this is especially because the contraction in the industrial and 
service sectors and subsequent job losses is ultimately likely to 
unwind the gains made in reducing vulnerability and poverty. 
Indeed, the number of people living below the poverty line 
is likely to increase from 8.7 million to 11.7 million, a 34.5% 
increase.27 Besides, gains made in structural transformation 
are at risk given the contraction in both the services and 
industrial sectors. The aforementioned risks are, however, 
partly offset by the fairly moderate number of recorded 
COVID-19 cases and deaths in the country, which meant 
that Uganda’s health system was at no one time deemed 
overwhelmed by an overload of COVID-19 cases. As such the 
country is seen as successful in its COVID-19 management. 
Monetary policy response
In an effort to moderate the distortionary effect of COVID-19 
and COVID-19 containment measures on Uganda’s economy, 
the government adopted an aggressive expansionary 
monetary policy strategy aimed at improving liquidity and 
27 World Bank, “Uganda’s GDP Contracts Under COVID-19, Investing in Uganda’s Youth Key 
to Recovery”, Press Release No. 2021/066/AFR, December 2, 2020, https://www.worldbank.
org/en/news/press-release/2020/12/02/ugandas-gdp-contracts-under-covid-19-investing-
in-ugandas-youth-key-to-recovery.
“These measures played 
a key role in delaying 
the spread of COVID-19. 
However, the travel 
restrictions were the 
starting point towards 
undermining the flow of 
tourism receipts. Indeed, 
as COVID-19 cases picked 
up and the government 
closed all borders except 
for emergencies, it literally 
brought the tourism sector 
to a standstill to the extent 
that there were no earnings 
in Q4 of 2019/20”
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maintaining private sector access to credit at an affordable 
cost. The objective was to maintain momentum in the 
economy to enable a smooth and robust recovery. As such, 
the Bank of Uganda reduced the CBR by 1 percentage point 
to 8% in April 2020. Furthermore, in June 2020 the CBR was 
reduced by 1 percentage point to 7%. The CBR has been 
maintained at 7% up to March 2021. The reduction in the CBR 
was aimed at signalling to commercial banks to lower their 
interest rates on credit facilities and to avail affordable credit 
to MSMEs countrywide. 
Monetary policy has been partly successful in bringing down 
the lending rate to 17.7% in April 2020, which is the lowest 
lending rates have been since June 2018. Nonetheless, the 
lending rates picked up again peaking at 20.9% in July 2020 
and later tapering off to 17.4% in January 2021. The outcome 
could have been worse had the Bank of Uganda not reduced 
the CBR, especially with the hindsight of risk averseness 
among creditors and operational costs within the financial 
sector.
Financial sector responses
In order to moderate capital adequacy, liquidity and credit 
default risks within the financial sector were addressed. With 
regard to minimising credit default risk, the Bank of Uganda 
adopted the following credit relief measures: repayment 
holidays for a maximum of 12 months, loan tenor extensions 
and other forms of debt restructuring covered in existing 
regulations; and the prepayment of arrears as a condition for 
restructuring a credit facility suspended for 12 months with 
effect from April 1, 2020. The number of restructured loans to 
mitigate the impact of COVID-19 on borrowers was 500 000 
in Q4 of FY2020 compared to 0 in FY2018/19.28 
28 World Bank, “COVID-19 Economic Crisis and Recovery Development Policy Financing 
Report”, Report No. PGD203, June 12, 2020, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/
en/609321593741824637/pdf/Uganda-COVID-19-Economic-Crisis-and-Recovery-
Development-Policy-Financing.pdf.
“In an effort to moderate 
the distortionary effect of 
COVID-19 and COVID-19 
containment measures on 
Uganda’s economy, the 
government adopted an 
aggressive expansionary 
monetary policy strategy 
aimed at improving liquidity 
and maintaining private 
sector access to credit at an 
affordable cost”
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With regard to liquidity support, the Bank of Uganda set up 
a liquidity assistance programme for all SFIs facing liquidity 
pressures. It included provision of the following: liquidity 
assistance to SFIs for longer periods of up to one year, 
through the issuing of reverse REPOs of up to 60 days at the 
CBR, with the opportunity for roll over, as well as standing 
facilities; purchase of Treasury bonds held by MDIs and CI; 
and the provision to MDIs and CIs, which do not hold Treasury 
bills or bonds in their asset holdings, of liquidity secured by 
their holdings of unencumbered fixed deposits or placements 
with other SFIs.
These interventions buffered the financial sector from the 
COVID-19 headwinds and achieved the goal of ensuring 
financial sector stability. Indeed, all the indicators of capital 
adequacy, liquidity risk and credit risk are well above the 
threshold among commercial banks, CIs and MDIs. As such 
investor confidence in Uganda’s financial markets was 
boosted as is reflected by the relatively lower money market 
interest rates and yields on government securities. Even 
the profitability indicators (ROA and ROE) show reduced 
profitability especially among CIs. 
Also, the Bank of Uganda adopted digital responses within 
the financial sector in an effort to abate the spread of 
COVID-19 through in-person financial transactions. As 
such, effective March 25, 2020, the bank spearheaded the 
zero rate charges for peer to peer, wallet to bank and bank 
to wallet transactions. Consequently, the financial sector 
witnessed an upsurge in digital financial services uptake 
in the year to December 2020. For example, the value of 
mobile and internet banking transactions rose by 135.2% 
and 30.2% respectively. Furthermore, the value of mobile 
money transactions grew by 28.2% to UGX 93.7 trillion 
($26.7 billion), compared to 2.9% in 2019. Finally, over the 
quarter ending December 2020, the mobile money escrow 
account balances increased by 42.9% to UGX 1 083.4 billion 
“These interventions 
buffered the financial 
sector from the COVID-19 
headwinds and achieved the 
goal of ensuring financial 
sector stability. Indeed, all 
the indicators of capital 
adequacy, liquidity risk 
and credit risk are well 
above the threshold among 
commercial banks, CIs  
and MDIs”
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($296.8 million).29 As such, it is evident that the financial sector has embraced digitalisation, 
which is equally critical in reducing the cost of financial transactions besides abating the spread 
of COVID-19 through paper money, physical visits to the premises of commercial banks and 
designated automated teller machine areas. 
Fiscal policy responses
Government adopted a fiscal stimulus package targeting both households and the private 
sector. With regard to the private sector, government adopted the following tax relief measures: 
deferred payment of corporate tax income or presumptive tax for corporations and MSMEs; 
deferred pay as you earn (PAYE) until September 2020 by sectors most severely affected by 
COVID-19 pandemic such as, manufacturing, tourism and floriculture; and waived interest on tax 
arrears, provided for tax deductibility of donations for the COVID-19 response and committed 
to expedite payment of outstanding VAT refunds. Indeed, the liquidity provided to taxpayers 
on account of listed deferments on corporate tax, PAYE and presumptive tax payments for 
firms in the manufacturing, tourism, horticulture and floriculture sectors with a turnover below 
UGX 500 million amounted to UGX 125 billion in both Q4 of FY2019/20 and Q1 of FY2020/21 
compared to 0 in FY2018/19 (see Table 7).
The tax relief measures were instrumental in enabling businesses to enjoy a temporary liquidity 
shield in the midst of dampened aggregate demand and risk averse creditors. However, this 
came at the cost of a revenue collection shortfall, the effect of which is an increase in public 
debt. The increase in public debt has been both in terms of external and domestic borrowing. 
Unfortunately, the increase in domestic borrowing has enhanced the crowding out of the private 
sector while increased external borrowing has resulted in increased external debt vulnerability as 
indicated by the present value of external debt to exports ratio. This implies that any shock to 
exports increases the risk of external debt default. Furthermore, external debt service to revenue 
is well below the low-income country debt sustainability framework threshold implying that 
external debt service is growing at a higher rate than domestic revenue in the medium term. 
This is likely to increase the risk of resource reallocation from growth and welfare enhancing 
sectors to debt service. Finally, the increase in external debt uptake has resulted in an increase in 
international reserve requirements to fulfil short-term debt maturities. This implies that there is 
an inherent exchange rate risk on account of the increase in external public debt as a proportion 
of total public debt from 66.5% in FY2018/19 to 68.5% in FY2019/20. 
29 Bank of Uganda, “Financial Stability Review”. 
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Table 7 Domestic debt sustainability benchmarks
Sector and type of tax Expected revenue loss in UGX billion
Manufacturing: Corporate tax 12.5
Manufacturing: PAYE 57.4
Tourism: PAYE 8
Floriculture: PAYE 0.2
MSMEs: Presumptive 1.4
Tax refunds 120.5
Interest and penalty on tax arrears 50
Total 250
Source: World Bank, “COVID-19 Economic Crisis and Recovery Development Policy Financing Report”, Report No. PGD203, June 12, 2020, https://
documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/609321593741824637/pdf/Uganda-COVID-19-Economic-Crisis-and-Recovery-Development-Policy-Financing.pdf
While tax relief efforts induced an upsurge in public debt 
uptake and its associated risks, it was critical for government 
to undertake the intervention. This is because the survival 
of businesses was key to protecting jobs and livelihoods 
in the midst of COVID-19 headwinds. During tough times, 
businesses would be in a position to not only create more jobs 
but also contribute to the domestic revenue basket.
With regard to the spending stimulus, the Ugandan 
government spent 0.2% of GDP in FY2019/20 on 
strengthening health systems, additional security measures 
and mitigating the impact of COVID-19 containment 
measures on livelihoods especially in the Kampala and 
Wakiso districts. With only 48 231 hospital beds, 55 functional 
intensive care units, 411 functional ambulances for a country 
with a population of at least 44 million and 39 districts 
without a hospital,30 it was paramount that health systems 
should be strengthened in preparation for possible COVID-19 
hospitalisations. Indeed, the health system was strengthened 
through procuring medical supplies and equipment, and 
hiring of additional health workers, to enable the treatment 
of COVID-19 cases at the cost of UGX 120 billion ($32.87 
30 Nambatya Prosscovia, “Uganda’s Covid-19 Supplementary Budget: Pandemic Response or  
Cash Bonanza?”, 2020, https://www.cmi.no/publica tions/7279-ugandas-covid-19-supplem 
entary-budget-pandemic-response-or-cash-bonanza.
“Unfortunately, the increase 
in domestic borrowing has 
enhanced the crowding out 
of the private sector while 
increased external borrowing 
has resulted in increased 
external debt vulnerability 
as indicated by the present 
value of external debt to 
exports ratio. This implies 
that any shock to exports 
increases the risk of external 
debt default”
36 Efficacy of COVID-19 Macroeconomic Policy Responses in Uganda
million) (see Table 8). Furthermore, because of the loss of jobs and livelihoods, the government 
intervened and supplied food to vulnerable households in Kampala and Wakiso. While this was 
commendable it unfortunately left out vulnerable households in other urban, peri-urban and 
rural areas who equally experienced COVID-19 induced livelihood disruptions. On a positive note, 
however, the government increased number of senior citizen grant31 beneficiaries from 150 000 in 
FY2018/19 to 350 000 in FY2019/20, a 133.3% increase.32
Table 8 Expenditure response to COVID-19
Type of expenditure Expected revenue loss in UGX billion
Strengthening health systems 120
Emergence funds for sectors complementing the health sector 220
Security 81
Local government 36
ICT 14
KCCA 30
Disaster preparedness/food to vulnerable groups in Kampala 59
Sub-total: health and complimentary measures 340
Support to water and electricity utilities Not costed
Recapitalisation of UDB to provide funding for MSMEs 1 040.50
Recapitalisation of UDC to provide funding for MSMEs 100
Total 1 480.5
Source: World Bank, “COVID-19 Economic Crisis and Recovery Development Policy Financing Report”. Report No. PGD203, June 12, 2020, https://
documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/609321593741824637/pdf/Uganda-COVID-19-Economic-Crisis-and-Recovery-Development-Policy-Financing.pdf
Furthermore, the government also sought to buffer livelihoods through restoring household 
incomes and safeguarding jobs. Specifically, the government committed to the following:
• Enhance the provision of improved agricultural inputs using the National Agriculture Advisory 
Services (NAADs); 
• create jobs for the vulnerable but able-bodied people affected by COVID-19 by extending 
labour intensive public works in urban and peri-urban areas; 
• provide rainwater harvesting technologies in rural communities; 
• roll out regional and community-based storage facilities; and
31 The grant is worth $6.8 paid per month to persons over 65 years.
32 World Bank, “COVID-19 Economic Crisis and Recovery Development Policy Financing Report”.
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• provide seed capital to organised special interest groups 
under the youth fund, women entrepreneurship fund and 
the Emyooga talent support scheme. 
The Ugandan government has followed through with some 
of these promises. For example, through the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries, the government 
rolled out the e-voucher system to 10 additional districts in 
an effort to enhance the distribution of agricultural inputs. 
Consequently, 288 900 farmers were registered for e-vouchers 
in FY2020/21 compared to 268 991 in FY2019/20, a 7.4% 
increase.33 Also, with regard to the creation of jobs for the 
vulnerable but able-bodied persons34 affected by COVID-19, 
637 000 persons got jobs as a result of labour-intensive public 
works in FY2020/21 compared to 136 571 in FY2018/19, a 
366.4% increase.35
The government deemed water and electricity as essential 
services, and as such it instituted a temporary ban on 
disconnecting water and electricity services to vulnerable 
consumers. This fiscal stimulus measure ensured that 
the struggling private sector could at the minimum stay 
in business given liquidity constraints as opposed to 
being disconnected from water and electricity because 
of an inability to pay. Indeed, the number of households 
disconnected from water services was 88 224 in FY2018/19 
compared to 0 in Q4 of FY2019/20. Also, the number of 
residential, commercial and industrial customers receiving 
uninterrupted electricity services during the quarantine period 
remained the same in Q3 and Q4 of FY2019/20 respectively.36 
However, in an effort to avoid utilities from running out 
of capacity to cover operational costs and wages, the 
33 World Bank, “COVID-19 Economic Crisis and Recovery Development Policy Financing 
Report”.
34 These are largely youths who lost their jobs due to COVID-19
35 World Bank, “COVID-19 Economic Crisis and Recovery Development Policy Financing 
Report”.
36 World Bank, “COVID-19 Economic Crisis and Recovery Development Policy Financing 
Report”.
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government extended financial support to water and 
electricity service utilities. To further increase private sector 
liquidity, the government also prioritised the payment of 
domestic arrears. Indeed, the stock of domestic arrears as a 
percentage of GDP reduced to 2.4% in FY2019/20 from 2.8% 
in FY2018/19.37 
Furthermore, in an effort to provide seed capital, the 
government launched the Emyooga fund in August 2019 – a 
poverty eradication scheme worth UGX 165 billion ($45.2 
million).38 Emyooga targets the informal sector and 
specifically savings and credit cooperative societies (SACCOs) 
formed in 18 specialised fields including boda bodas,39 women 
entrepreneurs, carpenters, salon operators, taxi operators, 
restaurant owners, wielders, market vendors, youth leaders, 
persons with disabilities, produce dealers, mechanics, tailors, 
journalists, performing artists, veterans, fishermen and 
elected leaders. SACCOs for each of the aforementioned 
specialised fields were formed at the constituency level 
but with operations at the parish level through established 
parish associations.40 Each constituency was budgeted to 
receive UGX 560 million ($153 421); however, the Wakiso 
district was to receive UGX 4.4 billion ($1.2 million) because 
of having eight constituencies.41 While Emyooga is a poverty-
eradication scheme targeting the informal sector, it might 
fail to fulfil its obligations partly because access to credit 
hinges on the formation of SACCOs. This may result in people 
forming SACCOs merely to access money as opposed to 
setting up a business or injecting more liquidity into their 
enterprises. In addition, not only is the money inadequate, 
but the scheme is also likely to be plagued by corruption, 
especially by the district authorities who will be overseeing 
the fund. Furthermore, the fund is limited to youths between 
37 World Bank, “COVID-19 Economic Crisis and Recovery Development Policy Financing Report”.
38 The Daily Monitor, “Government Unveils Shs165b Poverty Eradication Scheme”,  
https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Government-unveils-Shs165b-poverty-
eradication-scheme/688334-5591234-8uhjru/index.html. 
39 Motorcycles registered for purposes of public transport.
40 The Daily Monitor, “Government Unveils Shs165b Poverty Eradication Scheme”. 
41 The Daily Monitor, “Government Unveils”.
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18 and 35 years thereby excluding other potentially more 
attractive business entities that are not eligible because the 
owners are not youths. 
Conclusion
This paper sought to explore the macroeconomic effect of 
COVID-19 on Uganda’s economy, the macroeconomic policy 
choices undertaken, and the inclusiveness and viability of the 
various macroeconomic policy choices made. The economy 
experienced an unprecedented economic and health shock, 
the effect of which was dampened economic growth at 
2.9% in FY2019/20, affecting the service and industrial 
sectors in particular. The slowdown in these sectors resulted 
in job losses or reduced income among those employed 
in the respective sectors. As such, urban poverty and 
vulnerability is likely to increase. Low food inflation resulted 
in low demand due to a trade slowdown and low aggregate 
demand will likely contribute to an increase in rural poverty. 
Overall, 3 million people are estimated to have fallen into 
poverty because of COVID-19. Furthermore, the external 
sector has experienced a reduction in FDI, remittances and 
record low tourism earnings. The financial sector, on other 
hand, remained stable albeit with reduced profitability. The 
aforementioned economic effects were partly accounted for 
by the COVID-19 containment measures as the government 
attempted to minimise the spread of the virus. 
While the economic effects are unprecedented, the 
government at least succeeded in moderating the number of 
COVID-19 cases and deaths. Furthermore, through monetary, 
financial and fiscal interventions, the Ugandan government 
attempted to moderate the economic impact of COVID-19 
on the economy. Monetary policy intervention was specifically 
aimed at boosting private sector investment and household 
consumption through influencing the reduction in market 
interest rates. Indeed, the expansionary monetary policy 
resulted in relatively low interest rates. Also, the government 
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intervention in the financial market to moderate against 
liquidity risk, capital adequacy risk and credit risk were 
successful as the sector was deemed stable given that all 
the financial soundness indicators were above the regulatory 
requirements. Investor confidence was enhanced as reflected 
by the relatively low market interest rates and low yields on 
government securities. 
Fiscal policy was equally successful in giving formal businesses 
a temporary liquidity shield through tax relief. However, 
this came at the cost of increasing public debt. The effect 
of which has been crowding out of the private sector due 
to: increased domestic borrowing; increased external debt 
vulnerability as indicated by the present value of external 
debt to exports ratio implying that any shock to exports 
increases the risk of external debt default; the external debt 
service to revenue ratio is below the regulatory requirements 
implying that external debt service is growing at a higher rate 
than domestic revenue in the medium term; and finally, an 
increase in international reserve requirements to fulfil short-
term debt maturities. Nonetheless, the number of formal 
businesses saved as a result of the liquidity and tax relief 
measures have protected jobs and livelihoods. The survival of 
these businesses guarantees future tax payment, which will 
be useful towards financing public debt. 
Besides formal businesses, an effort was made to target the 
informal sector and especially youth through the UGX 165 
billion Emyooga poverty eradication scheme. However, the 
Ugandan government ought to minimise leakages especially 
through corruption, which could undermine the flow of credit 
to the youth. Furthermore, opening up the funds to people in 
the informal sector beyond the ages of 18 to 35 years could 
ensure inclusivity and most importantly fund allocation to 
the most viable SACCOs. Also, by increasing the coverage 
of the e-voucher system for agriculture input supplies, 
the government is able to expand its reach to vulnerable 
households in rural settings. 
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Cover image: Abu Kikomeko, her sister Rebecca Nakyanzi and mother Glades Ssebwira , all vendors, pose for a photo 
before sleeping next to their items to be sold at Nakasero Market in Kampala, Uganda, on June 29, 2021. Under a strict 
42-day COVID-19 lockdown imposed on June 18, vendors at Nakasero market in downtown Kampala were allowed to 
keep trading - if they agreed not to return home and sleep where they worked. The government distributed mosquito 
nets, drinking water and soap to roughly 600 vendors suddenly faced with a six-week stretch away from home & 
confined to the cramped quarters of the marketplace  (Badru Katumba/AFP via Getty Images)
